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Abstract
This article examines recent studies of welfare expenditures by local 
governments in Japan since the beginning of the 1990s.　Previous studies 
analyzing the determinants of differences in welfare expenditure among 
local governments have regarded the financial conditions of local govern-
ments as an important factor.　Some studies, while not proving the validity 
of their hypotheses, conjectured that residents’ ways of thinking and family 
structures influenced local governments’ welfare outlays.　This article 
raises the possibility that local government expenditures on welfare pro-
grams are affected by the functionality of social networks, as wel as the 
activities of commissioned welfare volunteers and councils of social welfare.
I.　Introduction
One of the heaviest financial burdens for local governments in Japan (i.e., 
prefectural and municipal governments) is their outlay on welfare programs 
(minsei hi).　Total expenditures on welfare programs ranked the largest 
among expenditures by prefectural and municipal governments, as classified 
by purpose (mokuteki betsu saishutsu) in fiscal year (FY) 2011, according to 
the 2013 version of Chih oˉ zaisei hakusho edited by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (S oˉ mu sh oˉ ).　Percentages of local government 
outlays on welfare, education, public debt, and civil engineering were 23.9, 
16.7, 13.4, and 11.6 respectively in FY 2011.
The central government has been wiling to secure manpower and facili-
ties for welfare programs for the elderly and children since the end of the 
1980s.　This intention has been manifested in plans such as the Gold Plan, 
New Gold Plan, Gold Plan 21, Angel Plan, New Angel Plan, and Plans for 
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Supporting Children and Childcare (Kodomo kosodate oˉ en puran).　These 
plans set numerical targets for manpower and facilities throughout the 
country.　Local governments also made plans to secure manpower and 
facilities for welfare programs.　Amendments of welfare laws have strength-
ened local government capabilities for welfare programs since the beginning 
of the 1990s.　Local governments evaluate demands for welfare programs 
and provide appropriate welfare services for residents.　These endeavors of 
the central government and local governments imply that the enrichment of 
welfare programs has become an important purpose of the nation.
Although the expansion of welfare programs is a nationwide purpose, 
there are differences in these welfare endeavors among prefectural and 
municipal governments.　These differences then lead to disparities in local 
expenditure on welfare programs.　This generates a critical question: what 
causes the disparities?
A number of studies have atempted to answer this question.　This article 
aims to explain the previous studies addressing this research question, and 
highlight their methods and results.　The article focuses on existing studies 
that examine local government outlays on welfare programs for the elderly 
and/or children since the beginning of the 1990s.
Welfare programs provided by local governments belong to several sub-
fields of welfare policy.　Welfare policies for the elderly and children are 
two sub-fields of welfare in which the enlargement of the roles of local gov-
ernments is nowadays expected.　The early 1990s were the starting point 
for local governments securing manpower and facilities for welfare accord-
ing to plans made by the local governments.　The discussion in this article 
aims to determine how the research methods of previous studies can be fur-
ther developed in order to evaluate the determinants of local government 
expenditures on welfare programs.
The three sections below summarize the methods and analytical results of 
previous studies.　These studies emphasized the financial conditions of 
local governments, prefecture residents’ ways of thinking, and family struc-
tures as determinants of local government outlays.
204（　 ）204
II.　Financial Conditions of Local Governments
There are several indices that reveal the financial conditions of local 
governments.　One of them is the financial capability index (zaisei ryoku 
shis uˉ ), which shows a local government’s average financial condition for the 
last three financial years.　An index of one or higher signifies that a local 
government’s tax revenues are sufficient to meet necessary expenses; an 
index below one means that a local government’s tax revenues fal short of 
the amount necessary for the minimum level of government services.
Hasenaka (2006) utilized financial capability indices in examining the rela-
tionship between city government outlays on welfare programs for the 
elderly and city governments’ financial situations.　The study examined 
data for twenty city governments that joined the Association of Local 
Governments for Citizens’ Welfare (J uˉ min saido no fukushi gy oˉ sei o susumeru 
shich oˉ sonch oˉ no kai) when it was established in 1997.　A scater diagram of 
the city governments’ expenditures on welfare programs for the elderly per 
aged person and percentages of the elderly in the cities, from FY 1990 to FY 
1999, showed that al the city governments whose outlays on elderly welfare 
programs were large did not have high financial capability indices.　This 
finding implied that the effects of city governments’ financial capability indi-
ces on outlays for elderly welfare programs should not be overvalued.
Hasenaka also analyzed the relationship between city government outlays 
on elderly welfare programs and ratios of the elderly within total populations.　
Scater diagrams of the city governments’ expenditures on welfare programs 
for the elderly per aged person and percentages of the elderly in the cities in 
FY 1990, FY 1993, FY 1996, and FY 1999 revealed that city governments 
with relatively large outlays on elderly welfare programs had relatively high 
— or at least average — ratios of elderly residents within their populations.　
However, there were also city governments whose percentages of elderly 
citizens were relatively high yet whose expenditures on elderly welfare pro-
grams were relatively smal.　These findings signified that the influence of 
percentages of elderly residents on expenditures for elderly welfare pro-
grams should not be overestimated.
The amounts of general revenue sources (ippan zaigen) also indicate the 
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financial conditions of local governments.　Local taxes and local alocation 
tax (chih oˉ k oˉ fu zei) are the main components of general revenue sources.　
The central government provides a local alocation tax for local governments 
whose tax revenues are insuficient.　A local government can determine pur-
poses for which general revenue sources, including local alocation tax, are 
spent without the central government’s approval, even though the central 
government is the provider of the local alocation tax.　A large amount of 
general revenue sources leaves a local government with a large amount of 
financial discretion.
Nakazawa (2006) selected general revenue sources as an index of local 
governments’ financial conditions.　His study examined the relationship 
between city government expenditures on elderly welfare programs and gen-
eral revenue sources in FY 1998.　Multiple regression analyses were con-
ducted by utilizing data for al the cities, for cities with financial capability 
indices of 0.85 or higher, and for cities with financial capability indices below 
0.85.
The dependent variable was a city government’s outlay on elderly welfare 
programs, minus subsidies from the central government and the prefectural 
government per aged person.　The independent variables were: the city gov-
ernments’ general revenue sources per resident; the amount of central gov-
ernment and prefectural government subsidies for city government welfare 
programs for the elderly per aged person; the percentage of aged persons in 
the population; the average number of family members per household; indi-
ces of urbanization (numbers of people in tertiary industries divided by num-
bers of people in primary industries); the total number of days on which 
home-visit care (h oˉ mu herupu s aˉ bisu) for the elderly was provided, per one 
hundred aged persons; and the total number of quotas for homes for elderly 
people requiring special care (tokubetsu y oˉ go r oˉ jin h oˉ mu) per one hundred 
aged people.
The three analyses had a common result, in that the independent variable 
of “general revenue sources” had a positive and significant coefficient.　The 
two analyses of city governments based on their financial capability indices 
— those with indices of 0.85 or higher and those with indices below 0.85 — 
also obtained common results, in that the independent variable of “average 
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number of family members” had negative and significant coeficients and the 
independent variable of “urbanization indices” had positive and significant 
coefficients.　However, the absolute values of coefficients of family mem-
bers and of urbanization indices for the analysis of city governments with 
rich finances were larger than those for the analysis of city governments 
with poor finances.　These findings signified that rich city governments 
could expand welfare programs for the elderly more easily than poor city 
governments, according to changes in family structures and urbanization.　
The independent variables of “percentages of elderly people” had negative 
coefficients in the three analyses.
Moreover, Nakazawa conducted multiple regression analyses by adding 
two independent variables: the largest amount of city government expendi-
ture on elderly welfare programs per aged resident in the same prefecture, 
and the average amount of city government outlays on elderly welfare pro-
grams per aged resident in the same prefecture.　These independent vari-
ables were positive and significant in the analyses of city governments with 
financial capability indices of 0.85 or higher, and of city governments with 
financial capability indices below 0.85.　Nakazawa argued that while a rich 
city government tended to be affected by the highest city government outlay 
within the same prefecture, a poor city government was apt to be influenced 
by the average outlay of city governments in the same prefecture.
Additional studies have atempted to reveal the influence of local govern-
ments’ financial capability indices and general revenue sources on welfare 
outlays.　For example, Matoba (2008) examined divergence within munici-
pal government expenditures on welfare programs for children per capita, 
seeking the determinants of such differences.　The regions of Ch uˉ bu, 
Kant oˉ ,T oˉ hoku, and Hokkaid oˉ had smaler-than-average municipal govern-
ment outlays on welfare programs for children per capita in FY 1990, FY 
1995, FY 2000, and FY 2004.　Matoba calculated correlation coefficients 
between municipal government expenditures on welfare programs for chil-
dren per capita and municipal governments’ financial capability indices from 
FY 1996 to FY 2004.　The correlation coefficients fel between –0.173 and 
– 0.109.　These numbers implied that the relationship between municipal 
outlays on child welfare programs and municipal financial capability indices 
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was weak.
Matoba conducted multiple regression analyses in order to reveal the 
determinants of city government expenditures on welfare programs for chil-
dren per capita in FY 2002.　The independent variables were: city govern-
ments’ general revenue sources per capita; city governments’ local taxes per 
capita; national subsidies for child welfare programs per capita; the number 
of persons in tertiary industries divided by the number of persons in primary 
industries; the total quota of day nurseries per thousand residents; the total 
quota of day nurseries divided by the number of children enroled in day 
nurseries; and logarithms of municipalities’ populations.
Multiple regression analyses utilized data for al the city governments, city 
governments with fewer than fifty thousand residents, city governments 
with between fifty thousand and two hundred thousand residents, and city 
governments with more than two hundred thousand residents.　Multiple 
regression analyses were also conducted using data for city governments in 
the regions of Hokkaid oˉ ,T oˉ hoku, Kant oˉ ,Hokuriku, Ch uˉ bu, Kinki, Ch uˉ goku 
and Shikoku, and Ky uˉ sh uˉ .
The results of the analyses by population size showed that city govern-
ments with fewer residents tended to have more expenditures on child wel-
fare programs if the city governments enjoyed more general revenue 
resources, and that city governments with more residents were apt to 
expend more money on welfare programs for children if the number of per-
sons in tertiary industries divided by the number of persons in primary 
industries was higher (in other words, if the municipality was urbanized).　
The analyses by region revealed that city governments whose local tax reve-
nues were higher were inclined to have larger expenditures on child welfare 
programs in Kant oˉ Region and Kinki Region, which have larger populated 
areas than the other regions.
Matoba furthermore conducted multiple regression analyses that added 
two independent variables: the highest outlay on child welfare programs per 
capita among city governments in a prefecture in the previous FY, and the 
average of city governments’ outlays on child welfare programs per capita in 
a prefecture in the previous FY.　The results of the analyses showed that 
the t-values of the two independent variables were significant at the level of 5 
208（　 ）208
percent, and that the regression coefficients of these independent variables 
were positive.　These results imply that city governments tend to folow the 
expenditure standards formed within a prefecture.
Nakawaza (2009) also paid atention to the effects of the financial capabil-
ity indices and general revenue sources of local governments.　He exam-
ined whether the financial situations of municipal governments determined 
city government expenditures on welfare programs for the elderly per aged 
person in FY 2001.　Several previous studies had found that local govern-
ments with good financial conditions tend to make more outlays on elderly 
welfare programs.　Nakazawa verified the relationship between local 
finances and the outlay on elderly welfare programs after the introduction of 
Long-Term Care Insurance (Kaigo hoken) in 2000.　Long-Term Care Insur-
ance is a system that insures the purchase of care services for the elderly.　
Revenue for the insurance comes from people aged forty and older, the cen-
tral government, prefectural governments, and municipal governments.　
The introduction of Long-Term Care Insurance may have caused changes in 
the outlays on welfare programs for the elderly.
Nakazawa showed that the correlation coefficient between city govern-
ment expenditures on the elderly per aged person and city governments’ 
financial capability indices in FY 2001 was –0.054.　A multiple regression 
analysis was also conducted.　The dependent variable was a city govern-
ment’s outlay on elderly welfare programs per aged person in FY 2001.　
The independent variables were: a city government’s financial capability 
index; the square of a city government’s financial capability index; the per-
centage of people aged sixty-five and older within the population of a city; 
average income of city residents; a dummy variable of a city in T oˉ ky oˉ 
Metropolis; and a dummy variable of a city in Hokkaid oˉ .　The adjusted 
R-square was 0.035.　The t-values of “a financial capability index” and “the 
square of a financial capability index” were not significant at the level of 5 
percent.　These results do not indicate that the financial conditions of city 
governments determined expenditures on elderly welfare programs.
However, if the independent variable of “a reciprocal of a financial capabil-
ity index” was substituted for the independent variable of “a square of a finan-
cial capability index,” the t-values of “a financial capability index” and of “a 
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reciprocal of a financial capability index” were significant at the level of 1 
percent.　The regression coefficients of both of these independent variables 
were positive.　The adjusted R-square was 0.254.
Nakazawa suggested that a city government whose financial capability 
index is high tends to increase its expenditure on elderly welfare programs, 
and that a city government is apt to increase its expenditure on elderly 
welfare programs by folowing nearby city governments whose outlays on 
elderly welfare programs are large.　A multiple regression analysis was 
designed in order to verify the suppositions.　The dependent variable was a 
city government’s expenditure on welfare programs for the elderly per aged 
person in FY 2001.　The independent variables were: the city government’s 
expenditure on elderly welfare programs per aged person in FY 2000; the 
highest outlay of a city government within the same prefecture on elderly 
welfare programs per aged person in FY 2000; and the average outlay of the 
city governments within the same prefecture on elderly welfare programs 
per aged person in FY 2000.　Multiple regression analyses were conducted 
for city governments whose financial capability indices were one or higher, 
and for city governments whose financial capability indices were less than 
one.
The results of the analyses showed that the financial conditions of city gov-
ernments were related to city government expenditures on elderly welfare 
programs.　The analysis of city governments whose financial indices were 
one or higher revealed that although the t-value of “ the average of city gov-
ernment expenditures per aged person” was not significant at the level of 10 
percent, “the highest outlay of a city government within the same prefec-
ture” was significant at the level of 10 percent.　The regression coefficient 
of “the highest expenditure” was positive.　The adjusted R-square was 0.873.　
The t-values of “the highest expenditure” and of “the average expenditure” 
were significant at the level of 1 percent in the analysis of city governments 
whose financial capability indices were less than one.　While the regression 
coeficient of “the highest outlay” was negative, that of “ the average expendi-
ture” was positive.　The adjusted R-square was 0.508.　These results imply 
that a city government enjoying good financial conditions tended to folow 
an advanced city government within the same prefecture, and that a city gov-
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ernment whose financial conditions were not good was apt to try to 
approach the average expenditure in the prefecture rather than the highest 
outlay in the prefecture.
III.　Residents’ Ways of Thinking
Ichir oˉ Aoki has tried to elucidate the reasons why local governments in the 
western part of Japan tend to make larger outlays on welfare programs than 
local governments in the eastern part of Japan.　His conjecture is that resi-
dents’ ways of thinking in those prefectures are different from those in the 
other prefectures, and that this difference in ways of thinking influences the 
expenditures of local governments.
Aoki (2009) demonstrated that city governments in the western part of 
Japan made more outlays on welfare programs for the elderly and children 
per capita than city governments in the eastern part of Japan in FY 1993, FY 
1996, FY 1998, and FY 2002.　This tendency was also supported in compari-
sons of the expenditures in FY 1993 and FY 2002 between the eastern and 
western parts of Japan, according to the size of city populations.
Aoki denied the influence of local taxes on this disparity of welfare 
expenditures.　City governments in the eastern part of Japan tended to 
obtain more local taxes per capita than city governments in the western part 
of Japan from FY 1993 to FY 2002.　This fact implied that city governments 
enjoying sufficient local taxes nevertheless made meager outlays on welfare 
programs, and that city governments with weak finances made large outlays 
on welfare programs.
Aoki (2008a; 2008b) contradicted the influence of population density and 
the influence of the ratio of forest and field areas on city government outlays 
on child welfare programs per capita in FY 1993, FY 1999, and FY 2004.　
The analysis utilized data for city governments that had two hundred thou-
sand or more residents.　Aoki regarded population density and the ratio of 
forests and fields as indicators of cities’ geographical features.　Although 
there was disparity in city government expenditures on child welfare pro-
grams per capita between the eastern and western parts of Japan, there was 
not a clear contrast in population density and in the ratio of forest and field 
areas between the two areas.　Each part of Japan had variations in popula-
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tion density and in the ratio of forest and field areas among its cities.
Results of regression analyses employing ordinary least squares (OLS) 
also supported the claim that population density and the ratio of forest and 
field areas had litle effect on expenditures of city governments on child wel-
fare programs.　The dependent variable of two types of single regression 
analyses was the expenditures of city governments with two hundred thou-
sand or more residents on child welfare programs per capita in FY 1999.　
The independent variables of the two types of single regression analyses 
were population density and the ratio of forest and field areas.　The 
R-squares of the regression equations for the analyses of city governments 
with smal, middle, and large numbers of residents fel between 0.000553 
and 0.045.　These R-squares were low.　The t-values of the independent 
variables were not significant.
Aoki (2007) repudiated the effects of household features on the disparity 
in child welfare expenditures between the eastern and western parts of 
Japan.　Data for FY 1995 could not sufficiently explain the relationship 
between local government outlays on welfare programs for children and 
household features, such as the ratio of nuclear households with a child or 
multiple children at six years of age or younger to total households, or the 
ratio of nuclear and double-income households with children at six years of 
age or younger to total households.　Aoki stated that these two household 
features should have less influence on local government expenditures on 
child welfare programs than the numbers of children.
Aoki (1995) denied that the percentages of children or elderly people 
within prefectures determined diferences in the total expenditures of prefec-
tural and municipal governments on welfare programs for children or the 
elderly per resident between densely populated prefectures in the eastern 
part of Japan and thickly populated prefectures in the western part of Japan 
in FY 1988, FY 1990, and FY 1992.　The selected prefectures were Saitama, 
Chiba, T oˉ ky oˉ ,and Kanagawa in the eastern part, and Ky oˉ to, Oˉ saka, Hy oˉ go, 
and Nara in the western part.　Total expenditures of prefectural and munici-
pal governments on welfare programs for children or the elderly tended to 
be larger in a western prefecture than in an eastern prefecture.　Aoki 
pointed out, however, that the difference in the percentages of children and 
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the elderly between the eastern prefectures and the western prefectures was 
not appreciable.　Moreover, there was variation in those percentages 
among prefectures in each area.
Aoki (2007; 2008a; 2008b) conjectured that variations in residents’ ways of 
thinking among prefectures (kenmin sei) cause differences in local govern-
ment expenditures between the eastern and western parts of Japan.　This 
hypothesis supposes that differences in residents’ subjectivity, among the 
two areas, determine local government expenditures.　The performance of 
local governments’ duties according to residents’ subjectivity causes differ-
ences in expenditure among local governments.
IV.　Family Structures
Similarly to Aoki (1995; 2007; 2008a; 2009), Murata (2009) also demon-
strated that western prefectural and municipal government expenditures on 
welfare programs for the elderly (per aged person) tended to be higher than 
those of the eastern prefectural and municipal governments in FY 2005.　
Murata suggested that diferences in family structure may lead to this dispar-
ity in prefectural and municipal outlays.
V.　Discussion
Previous studies have examined the determinants of local government 
expenditures on welfare programs for the elderly and/or children.　The 
effects of local governments’ financial conditions have been confirmed.　
New studies should assume that the financial situations of local govern-
ments affect local government outlays on welfare programs.
Although not clearly proven in previous studies, differences in residents’ 
ways of thinking and in family structure among prefectures or municipalities 
may lead to disparities in local government outlays on welfare programs.　
Of the two factors, residents' ways of thinking, peculiar to a certain prefec-
ture, seems to be a difficult factor to grasp and to employ as an indicator for 
analysis.　However, “social networks” might be utilized in place of “resi-
dents’ ways of thinking” within analysis.　Social networks are formed by per-
sons and organizations within communities.　If an area has close social 
networks, residents can easily help each other.　Residents living in an area 
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where social networks do not sufficiently function want assistance from local 
government rather than from other residents.　Social networks may deter-
mine residents’ ways of thinking about whether they should ask for help 
from other residents or from local government.
Family structures also seem to be related to demands for welfare 
programs.　It is difficult for a smal-sized household to anticipate that it may 
obtain help for the elderly or for children from its family members.　Public 
welfare services are essential for smal-sized households in taking care of 
the elderly and children.　Therefore, family components may determine a 
local government’s outlay on welfare programs.　Family structures are also 
relevant for social networks formed by family members.　For example, a 
parent involved in child rearing tends to form connections with other par-
ents rearing their children (Hiromoto 2012).
There are half-public/half-private actors in the welfare policy field, known 
as commissioned welfare volunteers (minsei in) and councils of social wel-
fare (shakai fukushi ky oˉ gi kai).　How active these actors are in communities 
may influence local government expenditures on welfare programs.　If the 
actors provide sufficient assistance for residents in a community, the local 
government’s role in the policy field of welfare can be reduced.
Although commissioned welfare volunteers are nominated by prefectural 
governors and are commissioned by the Minister of Health, Labour and 
Welfare, the volunteers are unpaid and half-private.　The volunteers are con-
sulted about daily life by residents, offer necessary support, explain welfare 
services to residents, assist organizations and persons engaged in welfare 
activities, and cooperate with administrative welfare organizations. 
Commissioned welfare volunteers are assigned to each municipality.
A council of social welfare is another example of half-public/half-private 
actors in the field of welfare.　There are councils of social welfare at the lev-
els of the nation, prefectures, municipalities, and wards of government 
ordinance-designated cities (seirei shitei toshi).　The councils are private 
organizations controled under articles of the Social Welfare Act (Shakai 
fukushi h oˉ ).　Article 109 of the Act alows municipal and ward councils of 
social welfare to plan and implement services of social welfare, and to help 
residents to participate in activities of social welfare.　Article 110 stipulates 
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that prefectural councils of social welfare train workers engaged in services 
of social welfare, and offer guidance and advice on providing such services.　
The central government and the local governments financialy support the 
councils.　These legal and financial interventions in the councils by the cen-
tral and local governments generate the half-public/half-private characteris-
tics of these organizations.
Previous studies have not necessarily paid atention to social networks 
and half-public/half-private actors in the field of welfare.　Thus, there is a 
possibility that analysis of the influence of these networks and actors may 
obtain new findings.
VI.　Conclusion
This review of previous studies suggests some key features for a new analy-
sis of the determinants of local government outlays on welfare programs.　A 
new analysis should presume that the financial conditions of local govern-
ments are one of the important determinants.　There is room to examine 
the influence of social networks and half-public/half-private actors on local 
government expenditures.　Examining the effects of these networks and 
actors on local government welfare expenditures may contribute to a beter 
understanding of tendencies within welfare policy since the beginning of the 
1990s.
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